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1. INTRODUCTION
I want to thank program planners for the opportunity to respond Dr. BermejoLuque’s paper and also to thank Lilian for a very interesting and instructive essay.
Regardless of some areas disagreement, I think Lilian would agree that presumption
comprises a topic great importance to students of argumentation and, also, that it
has received far too little careful attention. In what follows I will first offer an
overview Lilian’s account; I will note a serious reservation, before turning what to
what I take to be the major area in which we may disagree.
2. BERMEJO-LUQUE’S ANALYSIS OF PRESUMPTION
According to Lilian’s account presumptions are a kind of speech act on the order of
constantives like assertions and promises. “Like assertions,” she writes
presumptions may be correct or incorrect as speech acts, and it is their correctness
condition as speech act what determines the semantic assessment of those pieces of
argument that involve them.” In the interest of ultimately providing normative
models for argumentation, Lilian gives priority to the questions, “. . . what is a
presumption, and what makes a presumption correct? In this connection she
distinguishes presumptions from presumptive inferences and offer correctness
conditions for both.
In response to the first question Lilian proposes that “a presumption is the
speech act of putting forward a proposition as a reasonable assumption.” In this
view a presumption will be correct, if the proposition put forward is a reasonable
assumption. An assumption may be reasonable on both epistemic and pragmatic
grounds. In turn, a presumptive inference, concluding in presumably that p, has a
presumption as its warrant. Presumptive inferences, according to Lilian’s account,
are valid (correct) “if the presumptions that constitute their warrants are correct
presumptions. . . . And they will be good arguments if their reasons and warrants are
both correct” (Bermejo-Luque, 2013).
Lilian’s paper fits this analysis into her larger picture of arguments as second
order speech acts. With that overall view in mind, she addresses several questions
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regarding presumptions for which theorists have offered different answers.
3. A PRELIMINARY RESERVATION
Professor Bermejo-Luque and I share over-lapping interests and common concerns,
but we approach study of presumptions from rather different perspectives. Both of
us, it seems, suppose that students of argumentation ought to attend closely to the
speech acts by means of which agents engage in arguments. Moreover, both of us
are concerned with equipping argumentation studies with a sturdy armament for
analysing and assessing arguments. But we approach these interests and concerns
from somewhat different perspectives. Lillian works, we might say, from the top
down. She has an apparently well-developed linguistic normative model for
argumentation, LNMA, and her interest in presumption is explicitly directed to
accounting for that practice, within her normative model for argumentation. I, on
the other hand, approach study of presumptions more or less from the bottom-up. I
start from the presumption, which animated the “discovery” of speech acts by
Austin, Strawson, Grice, and others, that ordinary-day-to-day discursive practices
rest on time-tested practical strategies which may need revision but which merit at
least the supposition that they are coherent and productive (Austin, 1961; Grice,
1989; Strawson, 1964) . Accordingly, I do not start from an abstract theoretical
orientation to the study of presuming and presumption. My primary questions have
been what are we doing when we presume things and what is that we take when we
garner presumptions from this activity? Over the decades of working with pragmadialecticians, I have learned to respect and gain enlightenment from work animated
by more abstract models, and I would not presume here on short notice to critique
what seems to be a very interesting linguistic normative model for argumentation.
Instead, I will express some reservations regard her account..
My first reservation focuses on the classification of presumptions as speech
acts. Lillian is not alone in advancing this idea, and it has the theoretically motivated
advantage of linking her work to various broader theories regarding speech acts. My
immediate doubt focuses on whether presuming is properly and/or productively
classified as a speech act. In J. L. Austin’s initial formulation of this term of art, and it
will be recalled that Austin “discovered” this family, speech acts are performed in
and by saying something or doing something which is the virtual equivalent of
saying something (Austin, 1962). In promising, for example the speaker must (both
conceptually and practically) say that she will do that which she promises to do (or
produce a semantically equivalent utterance). Now, is possible to presume
something in an utterance-act which explicitly involves a speaker’s saying that
which she presume, e.g., “Dr. Livingston, I presume.” And we have forms of speech in
which a supposition conforming to Lilian’s analysis can be presented in appropriate
utterance, e.g., ‘It is reasonable to assume that p’. Still, I seriously doubt whether
throughout our pervasive practice of presuming things, anything more than a very
small proportion of such acts involve saying anything. You, for example, invite me to
a reception; I enter the appropriate room, presuming that I will be welcome. There
may be a conversational exchange affirming this presumption, but such exchange is
not conceptually, and often would not be practically, necessary. Again, as a standing
2
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presumption, we presume good will and proper regard from our fellows (Strawson,
1968). These presumptions, integral to the texture of our day-to-day lives are apt to
be articulated only when they are breached.
Were we to seriously count presumptions as speech acts, we would populate
our cognitive/discursive domain with a bewildering array of speech acts. Consider,
if I seriously say and apparently mean that p, my utterance act warrants (other
things being equal) the presumption that I am sincerely expressing beliefs the
rational and empirical adequacy of which I have made a reasonable effort to
ascertain. Do we want to say in this case that I have performed the act of seriously
saying something and in the course of performing that act I have performed a
second speech act of presuming something? The consequent multiplication of
(redundant) acts of presuming in our social/cognitive space would simply be
enormous.
4. PRINCIPLE RESERVATION
Lillian’s rather elegant conception of a correct presumption as a reasonable
assumption has a certain theoretical appeal and, given the complexities of the
relationships between assumptions and presumption in our ordinary cognitive
scheme and corresponding practice, it has some plausibility as theoretical move.
However, regarding her conception from the standpoint of what can be ascertained
about our ordinary conceptions and practices of these two important activities, it
seems to me that Lillian’s conception of their relationship may well confound the
two to the detriment our capacity to critically evaluate relevant argumentation.
As I have argued at some length elsewhere, from an ethno-methodological
perspective, assuming and presuming are commonplace ways of taking something
on the basis of reasons. They have this in common: both are taken on the basis of
reasons which involve social considerations as well considerations related to the
substantial basis for the inference. Thus, I presume that A will be home by seven on
the grounds that A promised me to be home by that time; whereas, I might assume
that A will return at that time because she normally does and no one, myself
included has (so far as I can see) reason to suppose otherwise.1 Accordingly
presumptions have strength and force; if A does not return by 7:00, she has some
accounting to do. On the other hand, if I have merely assumed on the basis of past
regularity that A will be back by seven, the responsibility for this error is mine, not
hers. These differences between assuming and presuming ramify in somewhat
ascertainable ways.
Interesting differences also emerge when we consider the risks involved in
assuming and presuming things. Assumptions may be safe or dangerous. We say
'That's a safe assumption; everything argues for it, nothing against it’ or 'It's
dangerous to assume that; this is a very controversial matter’. The risks involved in
Another similarity is that both assumptions and presumptions characteristically operate where
more substantive reasons for accepting a proposition, when available, leave us less than certain. If
the facts of the case provide good and sufficient reason to believe that p, there would be little call to
assume or presume p.
1
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making an assumption are run by the assumer. One may be justified or warranted in
assuming that p, but an assumption is something one takes upon oneself in that
typically one bears a singular responsibility for the adequacy of what one assumes.
When a person presumes something, he or she characteristically takes it as
something to which he or she is entitled. In this connection presumptions are
subject to abuse in ways which assumptions are not. Where a person presumes
something to which he or she is not entitled, his or her behaviour takes the form of a
pretension; we describe it as “presumptuous,” using a disparaging sense of this
term. Of such a person we ask, “Who does she think she is?” Assumptions are also
subject to abuse, as when we speak of an arrogant assumption, but we do not have a
concept of “assumptuous” behavior.
Analysis shows that presumptions come to hand by virtue of reasons that
have a rather definite form. The superior presumes that his subordinate will comply
rather than risk reprobation for disobedience. Smith might presume upon his
friendship with Jones by entering the latter's home, expecting Jones to acquiesce
rather than suffer Smith's resentment upon being expelled. In each of these
examples something is taken to be the case on the grounds that someone has or will
have made that the case rather than risk resentment, criticism, reprobation, loss of
esteem, or even punishment for failing to do so. Here we find the defining mark of
presumption. We commonly use the expression 'He/she would not dare (do
anything so outrageous as) . . . ' to frame presumptive inferences.
Assumptions, on the other hand, are inferred on something like this basis: in
the present circumstance p may (safely) be taken as being true because no relevant
party is likely to raise compelling objections or doubts regarding p. Accordingly, we
describe assumptions as suppositions which are taken for granted. To take
something as being true is not to suppose that it is true; rather, it is to treat that
proposition as true for purposes of the discussion, inquiry, decision, etc., even
though it may not be known to be true and might even be known to be false
(Kauffeld, 1995).
My primary concern with Lilian’s account is that it blurs the difference
between these related, but essentially distinction cognitive and discursive activities
in ways which, where we to adopt her model and account as a primary matrix for
argument evaluation, would blunt rather than sharpen our capacity for normative
evaluation of arguments.
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